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Neuroscience has recently turned to the study of utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
moral judgment. Koenigs et al.1 examined the responses of normal and 
ventromedial-prefrontal-cortex damaged subjects to moral scenarios drawn 
from fMRI studies by Greene et al.2,3,4 and claim that patients with VMPC 
damage have an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of moral judgment. It is 
crucial to Koenigs et al.’s claims that Greene et al.’s scenarios pose a conflict 
between utilitarian consequence and duty; however many of them do not meet 
this condition. Because of this methodological problem it is too early to claim 
that VMPC patients have a utilitarian bias.  
 Greene et al. reported that brain areas typically associated with affect are 
activated when subjects make moral judgements about ‘personal’ scenarios 
where one alternative requires directly causing serious harm to persons. They 
found that in the minority that judges that such choices are appropriate, areas 
associated with cognition and cognitive conflict were activated as well. On the 
basis of a later study that found similar results in responses to ‘difficult’ personal 
scenarios, Greene has further suggested that the controversies between utilitarian 
and non-utilitarian views of morality ‘might reflect an underlying tension 
between competing subsystems in the brain’4, a claim taken up by leading 
ethicists5. 
 Koenigs et al. drew on Greene et al.’s battery of moral scenarios to 
compare normal subjects with six subjects who have focal bilateral damage to the 
VMPC, a brain region associated with the normal generation of emotions and, in 
particular, social emotions. They report that these patients “produce an 
abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements on [personal] moral dilemmas… 
In contrast, the VMPC patients’ judgements were normal in other classes of 
moral dilemmas.”1 These claims are based on VMPC patients’ pattern of 
response to ‘high-conflict’ scenarios, a subset of personal scenarios on which 
normal subjects tended to disagree and which elicited greater response times.  
 However, the methodology used by Koenigs et al. cannot support claims 
about a utilitarian bias. Data from the categorization of the scenarios by five 
professional moral philosophers shows that many are not of the required type. 
Only 45% of their impersonal scenarios and 48% of the personal ones were 
classified as involving a choice between utilitarian and non-utilitarian options. 
Koenigs et al.’s distinction between low and high-conflict scenarios does not 
correspond to a difference in the scenarios’ content. The high conflict scenarios 
are not all clear cases of utilitarian choice and some low conflict ones are very 
clear cases of such choice: Of the 13 high-conflict scenarios, our judges classified 
only 8 as pure cases of utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian choice; conversely, two low-
conflict scenarios were classified as such.  
 The battery of personal scenarios is therefore not an adequate measure of 
utilitarian choice and the distinction between low and high-conflict reflects only 
a difference in behavioural response rather than consistent differences in the 
content of the scenarios. Thus it is too early to claim that VMPC patients have a 
bias towards utilitarian judgment. Furthermore, whilst Koenigs et al. found that 
normal subjects rated personal scenarios as having significantly higher emotional 
salience than impersonal scenarios, they found no such significant difference 
between low and high-conflict scenarios.  So their proposal that an affective 
deficit explains the VMPC patients’ abnormal pattern of response to high-conflict 
scenarios is not clearly true. Similarly, it is unclear that this pattern of response is 
due to VMPC patients following “explicit social and moral norms”1, since their 
choices in high conflict scenarios are contrary to familiar social norms to prevent 
harm. 
 In conclusion, to establish that a response pattern manifests a tendency to 
utilitarian moral judgement, the stimuli used need to be classified in terms of 
content and not by purely behavioural or emotional criteria as was done here 
and in other studies such as Greene et al2,4 ,6. 
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